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In this paper, we review the existing empirical evidence on how individuals respond to the 
incentives created by a net wealth tax. Variation in the overall magnitude of behavioural 
responses is substantial: estimates of the elasticity of taxable wealth vary by a factor of 800. We 
explore three key reasons for this variation: tax design, context, and methodology. We then 
discuss what is known about the importance of individual margins of response and how these 
interact with policy choices. Finally, we use our analysis to systematically narrow down and 
reconcile the range of elasticity estimates. We argue that a well-designed wealth tax would 







The tax revenue which could ultimately be raised from a wealth tax depends not only on the tax 
rate(s) and pre-existing levels of wealth, but also on how individuals adjust their taxable wealth 
in response to the tax. Wealth may adjust mechanically, due to capitalization into land and house 
prices for instance. Individuals may also respond directly to the incentives created, reducing 
revenue and worsening economic efficiency. Such behavioural responses to wealth taxation can 
be real or reported. A real response to the imposition of a wealth tax might include a reduction 
in savings, emigration, or the shifting of wealth into tax-exempt asset classes (even if total 
wealth does not change). Alternatively, individuals may change their reported wealth by 
reallocating it within the household, under-reporting, or evading the tax.  
In this paper we assess how and why individuals adjust their wealth in response to a wealth tax, 
particularly focusing on the context of the UK. Crucially, we focus on how responses to a wealth 
tax would vary with choices made about policy design. These choices influence both the revenue 
that could be raised, and the efficiency costs of a wealth tax. While in practice policy design will 
take into account other features, understanding these twin consequences is essential.  
We begin by setting out the key quantity of interest – the elasticity of taxable wealth – and what 
is known about it from existing work studying wealth taxes. This elasticity measures the overall 
effect of a wealth tax on the amount of taxable wealth, and therefore on the amount of revenue 
that can be raised. Current estimates vary substantially, and we break this variation down into 
three key features: policy design and context, which both affect the true elasticity; and 
methodological approach, which affects the elasticity actually measured. Understanding the 
implications of each of these helps with interpreting the wide range of results currently seen, 
and how to map these onto an estimate that might be appropriate for the UK.  
To better understand the efficiency implications of a wealth tax, and which policy choices are 
critical in determining these, we then study specific margins of response. Four key facts stand 
out. First, when individual declarations are not verified in some way, individuals tend to under-
report and manipulate the reported value of their wealth to avoid the tax. Second, individuals 
adjust their portfolio composition in favour of tax-exempt assets, or assets which facilitate the 
exploitation of provisions to cap tax liabilities. Third, there is minimal evidence of reduced saving 
or labour supply in response to a wealth tax, and some evidence suggesting savings increase. 
Finally, given strong incentives to do so, individuals will also change their reported region of 
residence within a country to avoid paying a wealth tax, although there is little evidence on 
international migration.  
These responses should not be taken as a given: they are highly dependent on the design of 
policy. By using evidence on how elastic some margins can be, the UK could design a wealth tax 
which minimises the extent of such responses, potentially at some higher administrative or 
political cost. Examples of such choices include:  
● Third-party reporting of asset values, to limit the scope for under-reporting 
(Section 3.1). 
● Information sharing arrangements and other enforcement initiatives, to limit evasion 
(Section 3.2). 
● Maintaining a broad tax base (in terms of assets types), which can reduce asset 




● Avoiding tax liability caps which are linked to taxable income, as this can create 
incentives to manipulate income composition (Section 3.4).  
● Centralised tax design, which avoids creating incentives to migrate across regions in 
response to wealth taxation (Section 3.7). 
To produce a plausible elasticity for the UK, we consider the range of elasticities found in other 
countries. Taking each in turn, we consider which margins of response drive the taxable wealth 
elasticity, and to what extent these might be reduced given the likely design of a wealth tax for 
the UK. This is necessarily an uncertain process, not least because different margins of response 
are to some extent substitutable (Slemrod, 1990, 1995). However, our back-of-the-envelope 
calculations suggest that a well-designed UK wealth tax could achieve an elasticity of taxable 
wealth with respect to the net-of-tax rate in the region of 7-17 after a period of 4-8 years i.e. the 





2. Elasticity of taxable wealth 
2.1 What are we trying to measure? 
The elasticity of taxable wealth tells us to what extent levels of taxable wealth, 𝑊, responds to 
a change in the tax rate, 𝜏. In this paper, we report the elasticity, 𝜀, with respect to the net-of-tax 
rate on wealth, 1 − 𝜏. This is the percentage change in reported wealth in response to a 1% 
increase in the share of wealth kept by an individual after tax in a given year:  






As wealth tax rates are generally around 1%, this can also be interpreted as the percentage 
decrease in reported wealth in response to a 1pp increase in the wealth tax rate. This number 
will typically vary based on the time since the tax rate changed, as some responses take time to 
fully implement, and changes in wealth at a point in time may also affect future accumulation 
such that the full effect of behavioural responses is not realised immediately.       
We could also consider the response of taxable wealth to a change in the net-of-tax rate of return 
on wealth – the amount someone keeps after tax as a share of their income from wealth. This 
effectively compares the value of the tax to the return (or assumed return) on wealth. For 
example, with a 4% return on wealth, a 1% wealth tax would be equivalent to a 25% tax on the 
flow of income from wealth (‘capital income’).  
In practice, this equivalence between wealth and capital income taxes may not hold. When the 
return on wealth differs across individuals, or returns are uncertain, a change in the net-of-tax 
rate on wealth generates heterogeneous changes in the implied capital income tax rate across 
individuals, breaking the equivalence between the two concepts.  
Behavioural responses to a wealth tax may depend on whether individuals respond to the tax 
on the basis of its impact on their stock of wealth, or on their flow of income from wealth. If the 
latter, i.e. individuals respond to a wealth tax as if it is a tax on their capital income, then the 
elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate of return will be more relevant, and we would 
expect the response to be larger when returns on wealth fall. This is not the only example of how 
behavioural responses might depend on factors other than the rate and threshold set by tax 
authorities. We know, for instance, that the salience of taxation matters (Chetty, Looney and 
Kroft, 2009; Finkelstein, 2009), as does the use of tax withholding (Rees-Jones, 2018; Becker, 
Fooken and Steinhoff, 2019). 
We focus on reported taxable wealth, rather than total wealth (which includes any non-taxable 
assets), as this forms the tax base, so determines the revenue implications. This is also the 
concept of wealth studied in the empirical literature, partly because wealth which is exempt 
from a wealth tax tends to be absent from the data. However, if not all wealth is taxable, 
individuals may be able to reduce their tax burden by shifting wealth into exempt assets without 
changing their total savings (see Section 3.4), maintaining their ability to intertemporally 
smooth consumption. This will not affect the level of aggregate wealth in the economy but might 
affect the form in which this wealth is held.  
Wealth taxes are usually distortionary, but so are other taxes we might levy to raise revenue. 
What matters is, therefore, not whether we observe distortionary effects in practice, but how 
large these effects are and how the efficiency costs are likely to compare to other tax 




considered when choosing whether and how to tax wealth (see Adam and Miller, 2021, and 
Summers, 2021, for further discussion).1 Unfortunately, empirical evidence on the relative 
efficiencies of tax alternatives is lacking.2 
It is worth noting that there are some circumstances in which a wealth tax may improve 
efficiency. If individuals respond to a wealth tax by reducing their wealth accumulation, this 
alone could facilitate redistribution in a context with high capital-skill complementarity (Kina, 
Slavík and Yazici, 2019; Slavík and Yazici, 2019). Intuitively, if the productivity of high-skilled 
workers is enhanced relatively more than low-skilled workers by an abundance of capital in the 
economy, then reducing the amount of capital available could reduce the wage premium paid to 
high-skilled workers. The alternative approach to redistribution here would be higher income 
taxes, which may be more distortionary.  
Two final points are worth noting regarding the interpretation of estimated taxable wealth 
elasticities. First, these elasticities do not capture wealth accumulation occurring among 
individuals with wealth below the exemption threshold, whose saving behaviour may change if 
they expect that they may one day become eligible to pay. Some studies use these individuals as 
the comparison group, in which case the taxable wealth elasticity will be downward biased as a 
result. Others will not be biased, but simply will not capture this kind of response. Second, 
estimated taxable wealth elasticities depend on multiple margins of response which are to some 
extent substitutable, and the exploitation of one margin reduces the return to another (Slemrod, 
1990, 1995). If enforcement is lax, evasion may be a relatively costless tool for reducing one’s 
effective tax rate. This reduces the incentive to engage in real responses such as reducing one’s 
savings. On the other hand, in an environment with tight enforcement and high tax rates, 
individuals may choose between reducing their savings, reallocating their wealth portfolios, or 
migrating with their savings intact.  In the subsequent sections, we evaluate the margins of 
response which appear to be most utilised in different contexts, but the combination of 
responses is also a function of the enforcement environment. 
2.2 How does wealth respond to wealth taxation? 
Recent studies have provided a small number of estimates of the taxable wealth elasticity (Seim, 
2017; Zoutman, 2018; Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat, 2019; Agrawal, 
Foremny and Martinez-Toledano, 2020; Brülhart et al., 2020; Jakobsen et al., 2020; Londoño-
Velez and Ávila-Mahecha, 2020; Ring, 2020). However, elasticities are not structural 
parameters, they vary across contexts and are sensitive to policy choices which are highly 
heterogeneous across countries (see Perret, 2020). Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) formalise the 
idea that elasticities can, in effect, be chosen by policy makers. As such, it is not possible to 
directly infer from these studies what the magnitude of overall response in the UK might be. 
Instead, we examine the findings in the existing literature to understand which contextual and 
policy factors affect the elasticity, and what lessons the UK can learn from this. 
Each study presents a range of elasticity estimates, resulting from the use of alternative 
specifications. We do not cover each estimate here, but instead focus on the preferred or 
headline elasticity as chosen by the authors of the respective study. Headline elasticities with 
respect to the net-of-tax rate in the existing literature vary substantially (Table 1), ranging from 
0.054 to 43.2 — a factor of 800! Understanding why this variation exists is key. If the variation 
exists primarily due to heterogeneous policy choices, the UK ought to take lessons from this. 
 
1 See also Scheuer and Slemrod (2020a) for a discussion of the broader arguments for and against the 
taxation of wealth. 
2 For a review of the theoretical arguments surrounding different forms of capital taxation, see Bastani 




Some policy choices which are likely to reduce behavioural responses may be both feasible and 
desirable in the UK, while others may be harder to implement. If variation in the overall response 
is largely due to contextual factors, then placing the UK context among the settings for which 
we have evidence can shed light on how large the magnitude of response is likely to be in the UK. 
A third explanation for the range in estimates found in the existing literature is methodological. 
We consider the implications of methodological choices in terms of what effects they estimate 
when comparing the estimates. 
Such variation in taxable wealth elasticities produces wildly different revenue implications. 
However, even the highest elasticity, estimated by Brülhart et al. (2020) at 43.2, does not imply 
Laffer revenue effects i.e. the tax revenue gained from an increase in the wealth tax rate still 
exceeds the revenue lost through behavioural responses. However, since this is based on 
revenue from the wealth tax, it does not account for effects on other tax bases, such as income 
tax losses from those who emigrate. 
TABLE 1: ESTIMATES OF TAXABLE WEALTH ELASTICITIES IN EXISTING STUDIES  
Authors Country 
Elasticities w.r.t. net-of-
tax rate on wealth 
Time 
horizon Approach 













































Jakobsen et al. 
(2020) 
Denmark 8.9 (moderately wealthy) 














Colombia 2 N/A Bunching 
Seim (2017) Sweden 0.09-0.27 N/A Bunching  
Ring (2020) Norway 0.054 N/A Bunching  
 
2.3 Tax design features driving variation in elasticities 
The magnitude of taxable wealth elasticities varies with the design of the tax system (which can 
be changed), as well as the economic and social context (which cannot be changed in the short 




key design issues which influence the variation in elasticities seen in Table 1. Table 2 provides 
an overview of the key design features in each country for which we have empirical evidence. 
TABLE 2: KEY DESIGN FEATURES IN COUNTRIES WITH EVIDENCE ON RESPONSES TO WEALTH TAXATION  















Financial assets (cash, bank 
deposits, stocks, bonds, 
unlisted securities);  
Real estate (excluding main 
residence);  
Large durables;  
Non-corporate business 
assets;  
Assets held abroad; 
Less debt (including inter-
personal debts). 
Exempt: main residence, 
pensions. 




Yes: most financial 
assets and 
mortgage debt. 












Financial assets (cash, 
deposits, bonds, equities); 
Real estate; 
Large durables (e.g. cars, 
boats, aircraft); 
Business assets; 











and real estate. 














Financial assets (stocks, 
bonds, deposits); 
Real estate (excluding 
owner-occupied); 
Less debts (excluding 
mortgage). 
Exempt: owner-occupied 
housing (but imputed rents 
are taxed separately), 
pensions, businesses, 
durables. 







Financial assets (deposits, 
stock, mutual fund holdings, 




Housing is taxed at 
discounted market value. 
Exempt: pensions, durables. 



















Financial assets (bank 
accounts, bonds, shares, 
investment funds, life 
insurance); 
Vehicles, boats and aircraft; 
Art and antiques; 
Intangible assets (IP rights); 
Less debts (including inter-
personal debts). 
Exempt: elements of 
historical heritage, 
pensions, business assets 
and "closely held" 












and liabilities held 














Financial assets (bank 
deposits, bonds, quoted 
options, insurance); 
Real estate; 
Consumer durables (e.g. 
cars and boats); 
Less debts. 
Some assets (stocks, real 
estate, closely held 
businesses) were taxed at 
less than full market value. 
Exempt: pensions. 
National  1.5% (flat 
tax) 
Yes: financial and 
real estate assets 
and liabilities. No: 










Luxury and durable goods 
(excluding standard durable 
household goods); 
Some voluntary pension 
savings (a lower limit 
applies); 





















Notes: Where reported in local currency only, the exemption threshold is converted to USD using the 
average exchange rate for the year stated. Note that the tax schedule (rates and thresholds) change over 
time in all settings. The figures presented in this table reflect what the rates/thresholds were changed to 
as part of the reform used for estimating the elasticity presented in Table 1. 
Source: Brülhart et al., 2021; Agrawal, Foremny and Martinez-Toledano, 2020; Jakobsen et al., 2020; 
Londoño-Velez and Ávila-Mahecha, 2020; Ring, 2020; Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat, 
2019; Zoutman, 2018; Seim, 2017; Agencia Tributaria, n.d.; INE, 2012. 
 
First, taxable wealth elasticities tend to be higher under tax systems which provide greater 
scope for under-reporting (see Section 3.1). The use of third-party reporting of asset values (by 
financial institutions for example) is one influential factor (Kleven et al., 2011). The elasticity of 
taxable wealth is higher in Spain and Switzerland, where there is little or no third party 
reporting, than in Denmark, where most asset values are reported by third parties (Durán-
Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat, 2019; Brülhart et al, 2021; Jakobsen et al., 2020). 
This is not the only explanation for this difference, but as we describe in Section 4, taking 




Second, exempting assets from the tax base incentivises individuals to shift their portfolio 
composition in favour of exempt assets, potentially increasing the magnitude of the overall 
taxable wealth elasticity (see Section 3.4). In Catalonia, where a 1% reduction in the net-of-tax 
rate on wealth reduces taxable wealth by 32.4%, we observe substantial shifting of wealth 
toward exempt business assets and main dwellings (Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-
Montserrat, 2019). By contrast, the elasticity is much smaller in Denmark (11.3 for the very 
wealthy), where the wealth tax covered a much broader asset base (Jakobsen et al., 2020). The 
unequal tax treatment of wealth held in different forms therefore creates distortions through 
the reallocation of wealth. 
Third, wealth elasticities are sensitive to the degree of centralization of the wealth tax. In Spain 
and Switzerland, both countries with decentralized wealth taxation, inter-regional mobility in 
response to varying tax rates and exemption thresholds is likely to increase the overall elasticity 
of wealth. Mobility also encourages tax competition between regions, further eroding revenues 
(Brülhart et al., 2021; Agrawal, Foremny and Martinez-Toledano, 2020); effects which are 
frequently a concern among practitioners (Ramallo, 2020). In Switzerland, 17% of the overall 
response can be explained by inter-cantonal migration (Brülhart et al., 2021); individuals can 
easily reduce their tax liability by moving to a nearby canton without upending their lives. The 
large elasticity estimated in Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat (2019) explicitly 
excludes migration responses. However, significant reported migration responses to the wealth 
tax in Spain are found in Agrawal, Foremny and Martinez-Toledano (2020), discussed in more 
detail in Section 3.7. It is worth noting that these migration responses may reflect real or (only) 
reported changes in location, though the existing work does not distinguish between these. 
Even where there are real responses, they may reflect only a partial change in “footprint” by 
shifting the amount of time spent in different locations.  
Other dimensions of tax design may matter for specific margins of response, yet the wealth tax 
literature has little to say about the importance of these policy choices for the taxable wealth 
elasticities presented in Table 1. Examples include the enforcement procedures used to 
minimise under-reporting, the role of individual versus joint taxation of married couples in 
determining reallocation incentives, and policy choices concerning the tax liabilities of those 
who migrate.3 We discuss the potential implications of these policy choices for behavioural 
responses in Section 3, drawing on evidence from the wider tax literature where applicable.  
2.4 Contextual factors driving variation in elasticities 
Tax design choices matter for behavioural responses, but so does the context in which a wealth 
tax reform is implemented. Some evidence suggests that wealthier individuals respond more 
strongly to wealth taxation than individuals lower down the wealth distribution, though overall 
the evidence for this is weak (Jakobsen et al., 2020; Zoutman, 2018, Brülhart et al., 2021). If this 
is the case, countries with a large number of wealthy individuals might expect to observe larger 
elasticities than countries whose wealth distributions are more equal, for a given tax structure. 
Between 2013-16, the UK had the 16th highest top 1% wealth share (19.9%) among the 25 
OECD countries with available data.4 On this basis, responses at the top of the distribution may 
raise the elasticity of taxable wealth in the UK relative to countries with a more equal 
distribution. 
Initial asset compositions will influence the margins of response available to individuals, and 
hence the overall elasticity. Countries with high shares of housing wealth will face different 
 
3 Chamberlain (2020) discusses the practicalities of individual versus joint taxation and the incentives 
created by each, and explores the policy options for taxing those who migrate.  




behavioural responses compared to countries with high shares of financial wealth, for instance. 
Taxes on housing wealth are, in general, harder to avoid than taxes on less observable, more 
liquid assets.  Wealthier individuals also tend to hold a smaller share of their wealth in housing 
than individuals in the middle of the wealth distribution (Advani, Bangham and Leslie, 2021), 
suggesting that avoidance opportunities may vary across the wealth distribution. On the other 
hand, taxes on housing and land are most likely to be capitalised into market values, generating 
a mechanical effect on wealth.5 Brülhart et al. (2021) estimate a 20.4% increase in housing 
wealth (largely explained by increased house prices) in Lucerne, which halved its wealth tax rate 
from 0.56% to 0.28%, relative to Bern, which cut rates by only 0.1pp (0.74% to 0.64%). Their 
house price capitalisation effect is largely driven by intra-national migration however (discussed 
below), generating a stronger capitalisation effect than we might observe in the UK. 
The perceived permanence of the tax should, in theory, affect the type and timing of the 
response. The elasticity of taxable wealth in Catalonia (Spain), may have been larger had the tax 
been advertised as permanent rather than a temporary 2-year measure (Durán-Cabré, Esteller-
Moré, and Mas-Montserrat, 2019). Responses in Colombia are also likely to be affected by the 
high frequency of wealth tax reforms (Londoño-Velez and Ávila-Mahecha, 2020). These factors 
are partly a policy choice, but in the absence of being able to tie the hands of successor 
governments, they depend on individuals’ expectations. Behavioural responses to an annual 
wealth tax are likely to exceed behavioural responses to either a one-off tax, assuming the one-
off tax is announced with a past/current census date, or a temporary tax, for which costly 
adjustments may prove less beneficial.  
Empirical evidence suggests that the greater the change in wealth tax rates, the larger the 
elasticity (Londoño-Velez and Ávila-Mahecha, 2020; Brülhart et al., 2021; Agrawal, Foremny 
and Martinez-Toledano, 2020). A possible reason for this is that there are fixed costs associated 
with certain margins of response, either in the form of actual setup costs (e.g. incorporating an 
offshore entity), or mental costs associated with acquiring knowledge of techniques for avoiding 
the tax. These costs may only be worth incurring if the change in tax rates is sufficiently large.  
It is possible that individuals respond differently to a ‘new’ wealth tax than to a change in 
marginal rates under a pre-existing wealth tax. One reason is that a new tax may be more salient, 
generating larger behavioural responses. This could affect the generalisability of findings based 
on intensive margin reforms to the debate on the introduction of wealth taxes in other settings. 
Studies such as Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat (2019), who study the 
(re)introduction of wealth taxation in Spain may, for this reason, be more informative on the 
question of a UK wealth tax than studies such as Brülhart et al. (2021) and Jakobsen et al. (2020) 
who study intensive margin variation in wealth tax rates. 
Finally, the direction of the tax reform may matter for the magnitude of response. It is not clear 
that behavioural responses to a reduction in wealth tax rates should be symmetrical to a 
(numerically equivalent) increase in the tax rate. For example, individuals may be able to 
increase their spending (reduce their wealth accumulation) in response to an increase in tax 
rates faster than they can increase their savings (increase their wealth accumulation) in 
response to a reduction in tax rates. Gifting responses are also plausibly asymmetrical: if 
 
5 House price capitalisation has been observed in the UK in the context of other property taxes. Rosenthal 
(1999) estimates that one third of the change in local property tax liabilities associated with the 
replacement of Domestic Rates with the Community Charge (in 1990) was capitalised into house prices. 
Stamp Duty Land Tax has also been found to induce statistically significant house price responses (Best 
and Kleven, 2018). Though these mechanical effects have no efficiency implications, some individuals may 




individuals gifted their wealth in response to a wealth tax, it seems unlikely they would request 
it back in the event of a reduction in tax rates. 
2.5 Methodological differences driving variation in elasticities 
Methodological differences also generate variation in the observed magnitude of taxable 
wealth elasticities. Different approaches can yield different estimates even if the true elasticity 
remains unchanged. There are two common approaches to estimating taxable wealth 
elasticities: 'bunching' techniques, and 'difference-in-differences', which we describe briefly 
here.  
Bunching techniques exploit discontinuous changes in the tax rate at a particular wealth 
threshold. These create an incentive for individuals to target the value of their wealth such that 
they sit on the lower-rate side of the threshold. We can measure the magnitude of individual 
responsiveness by computing the amount of 'excess mass' at the threshold, i.e. how many more 
individuals do we observe at the threshold relative to what we would expect if the wealth 
distribution were smooth? The taxable wealth elasticity can then be calculated by comparing 
the excess mass to the magnitude of the incentive to bunch, which is determined by the change 
in tax rates at the threshold (see Section 2.1). 
Difference-in-difference methods compare the evolution of wealth between two groups of 
individuals who are differentially affected by policy change, typically a tax reform. For example, 
suppose a wealth tax reform increased the tax rate above a particular threshold, with no change 
in the tax rate below the threshold. After the reform, those above the threshold have an 
incentive to reduce their wealth, while individuals below the threshold do not (though as noted 
earlier, their incentive to accumulate further wealth is affected). As long as wealth for the two 
groups would have followed a similar trend in the absence of the reform, we can attribute a 
change in the wealth gap between the two groups to the change in tax incentive faced by those 
above the threshold. A test of the plausibility of this "common trends" assumption is typically 
provided by showing whether wealth trends for the two groups were similar prior to the reform. 
The elasticity can be computed by comparing the magnitude of the change in wealth gap to the 
magnitude of the tax change. 
Bunching techniques produce elasticity estimates which are local to the threshold level of 
wealth. Estimates of taxable wealth elasticities which are representative at the threshold are 
unlikely to be representative of the average individual above the threshold (indeed they are 
likely to be smaller). For the wealthiest individuals, targeting their reported wealth to just below 
the exemption threshold is simply not an option, unless the threshold is sufficiently high. These 
individuals must therefore respond along one of the many margins not captured by bunching 
estimates (e.g. portfolio adjustment, reduced saving, or migration).   
Bunching estimates of wealth tax elasticities are commonly thought to capture reported – 
rather than real – responses (Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat, 2019; Brülhart 
et al., 2021; Jakobsen et al., 2020). This is because it is difficult for individuals to precisely target 
the actual market value of their assets at a particular point in time. Reported responses (such as 
the under-reporting of self-reported assets) can be more easily manipulated to exploit bunching 
incentives, provided there is scope to do so given the tax design. Bunching could also be 
achieved by reallocating wealth across family members if these individuals are taxed as separate 
units, though the indivisibility of some assets may constrain this response. While individuals can 
(and do) retime their income receipts to exploit kinks in the income tax schedule (Miller, Pope 
and Smith, 2019), it is not generally possible to time wealth holdings in this manner. 




exception of trusts if these were to be treated as separate units for the purpose of administering 
a wealth tax (see Chamberlain, 2020).  
Overall, it seems unlikely that bunching estimates can provide much information on the 
magnitude of comprehensive responses to wealth taxation. They capture a limited range of 
responses and are specific to individuals with relatively low levels of taxable wealth. It is perhaps 
not surprising that bunching elasticities tend to be close to zero given that the incentive to 
manipulate reported wealth (and risk potentially large penalties) is likely to be small relative to 
the tax saving incentive for individuals in the vicinity of the exemption threshold, in the contexts 
studied in the existing literature.  
However, bunching estimates may provide useful information on behavioural responses to a 
specific optional element of tax design: banded valuations. Rather than taxing based on a 
continuous measure of net wealth, which would require a precise valuation, the tax liability 
could be determined based on the range – or ‘band’ – in which an individual’s net wealth is 
situated.  Such a valuation approach offers administrative benefits (see Daly, Hughson and 
Loutzenhiser, 2021 and Troup, Barnett and Bullock, 2020), but provides strong bunching 
incentives for individuals on the boundary of a wealth tax band, whose tax liability could be 
significantly reduced by reporting their wealth on the lower side of the boundary. Elasticities 
based on bunching could provide a useful measure of the efficiency cost of this valuation 
approach. 
Banded valuations create ‘notches’ – discontinuous changes in an individuals’ effective average 
tax rate and liability across some threshold – at the boundaries of each band. For example, the 
current UK Annual Tax on Enveloped Dwellings (ATED) charges no tax on properties owned by 
a company and worth less than £500,000, but £3,700 in tax on properties valued between 
£500,000 and £1 million (see Summers, 2021 for details). This creates a ‘notch’ at £500,000: an 
individual’s tax liability jumps from £0 to £3,700 when the value of their (enveloped) property 
crosses the £500,000 threshold. This creates strong incentives to have a value just below, rather 
than just above, the threshold. 
Such notches also exist when average tax rates change discontinuously for other reasons. For 
example, prior to Dec 2014, purchasers of UK homes paid 1% Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) on 
the full value of a purchase between £125,001 and £250,000, but nothing below £125,000. This 
‘slab’ structure again created strong incentives not to transact just above the threshold. It was 
reformed to move SDLT to a ‘slice’ structure of charges, with a tax of 2% on the value of the 
property above £125,001 for a purchase between £125,001 and £250,000. This discontinuous 
change in marginal rates (while the average tax rate and liability change continuously) is 
described as a ‘kink’. Notches give rise to stronger bunching incentives than kinks, and could be 
more salient among taxpayers. This may partly explain why the bunching elasticity for Colombia 
is higher than in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, or Switzerland (Londoño-Velez and Ávila-
Mahecha, 2020; Jakobsen et al., 2020; Seim, 2017; Ring, 2020; Brülhart et al., 2021), and may 
provide an indication of the taxable wealth response we would observe within the vicinity of 
each threshold if a banded valuation approach were adopted. 
Brülhart et al. (2021) identify a taxable wealth elasticity of 43.2 for Switzerland in their 
cantonal-level difference-in-difference analysis of aggregate wealth, and 0.7-0.8 using bunching 
methods applied to microdata for two specific cantons (Lucerne and Bern). This stark difference 
in estimates is perhaps less surprising given that bunching can only capture a limited range of 
responses: it will not capture migration responses for instance. It is also important to note that 
since wealth is highly skewed, we may expect different responses when individuals are weighted 




to wealth (as Brülhart et al., 2021, implicitly do in their aggregate analysis), if elasticities are 
systematically related to wealth.  
Besides the bunching estimates, the sizes of other elasticity estimates depend on what their 
underlying methodology enables them to capture. Difference-in-difference studies which use a 
balanced panel of individuals residing in the country before and after a tax reform do not capture 
the international migration response (Zoutman, 2018; Jakobsen et al., 2020). Durán-Cabré, 
Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat (2019) use a balanced panel of taxpayers residing in 
Catalonia and thus measure the overall taxable wealth response of ‘stayers’, missing migration 
to other Spanish regions or abroad. In contrast, the taxable wealth elasticity in Agrawal, 
Foremny and Martinez-Toledano (2020) isolates the effect of inter-regional migration on 
taxable wealth in Spain, excluding other behavioural responses, 6 thus explaining (in part) the 
large difference between these estimates.  
If behavioural responses tend to be greater among wealthier individuals, overall taxable wealth 
elasticities are also likely to be sensitive to the exemption threshold. However, the exemption 
threshold affects both where in the wealth distribution the tax base starts, as well as the 
incentive for individuals above the threshold to adjust their behaviour. The lower the exemption 
threshold, the larger the tax base and the harder it is to avoid wealth taxation altogether. 
Bringing moderately wealthy individuals into the tax base may also reduce the magnitude of the 
average response. On the other hand, the lower the exemption threshold, the higher the tax 
burden on the very wealthy (holding the rate constant), and hence the stronger the incentive to 
avoid the tax.  
Real responses take time to implement and overall behavioural responses will therefore only be 
realised in the long-run. Jakobsen et al. (2020) estimate the magnitude of the taxable wealth 
response over an 8-year period and calibrate a life-cycle model in order to simulate the long-run 
response. Their empirical evidence suggests that the effects of the 1989 Danish wealth tax cut 
on household savings grow over the study period and do not dissipate after 8 years. Their model 
implies that the response to a permanent wealth tax cut only flattens off after 25 years. The 30-
year elasticity of taxable wealth with respect to the net-of-tax rate is estimated to be 30 for 
moderately wealthy households and 45 for very wealthy households.7 However, one limitation 
of their approach is that the model attributes the entire response to changes in real behaviour, 
whereas the reduced-form estimates are likely to capture reporting responses too, and these 
could evolve quite differently. Brülhart et al. (2021), in comparison, observe a plateauing 
response after only 3 years.   
2.6 How do wealth tax elasticities compare to other taxes?  
While the literature on the taxation of wealth holdings is still small, it is instructive to compare 
taxable wealth elasticities to what is seen for other taxes. Taxable wealth elasticities are, on the 
whole, larger than estimated elasticities with respect to one-off taxes on bequests, which range 
 
6 Their taxable wealth elasticity is based on the stock of wealth in each region before and after migration 
responses to the reintroduction of the (decentralised) wealth tax. However, the stock of wealth in a region 
after the reform is based on fixing the wealth of ‘stayers’ at its pre-reform level and then adding for each 
region the pre-reform wealth of individuals who relocate there. The only behavioural response driving 
the taxable wealth elasticity is thus the migration response, since the wealth for each individual is not able 
to respond.  
7 Jakobsen et al. (2020) estimate the effects of a 1pp reduction in the marginal rate for moderately 
wealthy taxpayers, and a 1.45pp reduction in the marginal rate for the very wealthy. To obtain 
approximate elasticities w.r.t the net-of-tax rate, we divide the 65% change in wealth w.r.t a 1.45pp 




from 0.1-0.2 (Kopczuk, 2013). Responses to bequest taxation, which is levied once in an 
individual’s lifetime, are however difficult to compare with responses to an annual wealth tax.  
Translated into an elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate of return, the taxable wealth 
elasticity estimates are generally higher than previously estimated capital income elasticities. 
The elasticity of 43.2 identified in Brülhart et al. (2021) translates into a capital income elasticity 
of 1.05, higher than the 0.1-0.4 capital income elasticity estimate for Denmark (Kleven and 
Schultz, 2014) or 0.7 for France (Lefebvre, Lehmann and Sicsic, 2020). Elasticities with respect 
to the net-of-tax rate of return are, however, sensitive to assumptions on the rate of return.8  
The conversion of taxable wealth elasticities into capital income elasticities also depends on the 
prevailing capital income tax rate. To illustrate, we convert our preferred range of taxable 
wealth elasticities for the UK (7-17) presented in Section 4, to capital income elasticities using 
two initial values for the prevailing capital income tax rate: 20%, which is close to the UK tax rate 
on capital gains; and 40%, which is close to the additional rate of tax paid on dividends. Under 
the lower capital income tax rate, a wealth elasticity of 7-17 translates to a capital income 
elasticity of 0.3-0.5 assuming a 4.5% return on capital,9 or 0.2-0.4 assuming a 3% rate of return. 
The respective ranges under the higher capital income tax rate are 0.2-0.5 and 0.1-0.3. These 
are closer to existing estimates for capital income elasticities in the literature. 
3. Margins of response 
In evaluating the feasibility of Senator Elizabeth Warren’s wealth tax proposal for the US, Saez 
and Zucman (2019) employ a taxable wealth elasticity of 7.5, calculated by averaging the 
estimated elasticities from four of the above studies (Brülhart et al., 2021; Seim, 2017; Jakobsen 
et al., 2020; and Londoño-Velez and Ávila-Mahecha, 2020). Given the sensitivity of elasticity 
estimates to context, policy and methodology, this elasticity figure is somewhat arbitrary. We 
take a systematic approach by evaluating the importance of different margins of response in 
other contexts and considering the likely importance of these responses in the UK.  
Evaluating the magnitude of different margins of response is an important exercise in its own 
right, since each margin is associated with different revenue implications and policy 
prescriptions. Some responses have broader implications for other tax bases. If wealthy 
individuals migrate, we lose not only their wealth tax revenue but also revenues from taxing 
their income, for instance. We emphasise the key policy choices that ought to be carefully 
considered as part of a wealth tax proposal for the UK. 
3.1 Under-reporting 
Given the incentive and opportunity to do so, individuals may under-report the value of their 
assets (or inflate the value of their debts) in order to reduce their wealth tax liability. Individuals 
 
8 The elasticity in Brülhart et al. (2020) falls to 0.7 when a rate of return of 3% is assumed (rather than 
4.5% which is used to compute the 1.05 elasticity estimate). 
9 Assuming a rate of return of 4.5%, a 1 percentage point increase in the wealth tax rate is equivalent to a 
1%/4.5% = 22.2 percentage point increase in the capital income tax rate. If the capital income tax rate is 
initially 20%, the net-of-tax rate on capital is 80%. Thus, a 22.2 percentage point increase in the capital 
income tax rate implies a 22.2/80 = 28% increase in the net-of-tax rate. Since a taxable wealth elasticity 
of 7 implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the wealth tax rate reduces taxable wealth by 7%, this 
suggests that an equivalent 28% increase in the net-of-tax rate on capital must reduce wealth by 7%. 




could under-report at the extensive margin by failing to declare all of their assets, or at the 
intensive margin by under-reporting the value of declared assets. 
For this kind of response, administration and valuation are the key elements of tax design 
determining its extent. Administrators require knowledge of which assets are held by 
individuals (and other related entities).10 Here, the use of third-party reporting or registers can 
minimise the scope for extensive margin misreporting. Reliance on the self-reporting of wealth 
as a valuation approach invites under-reporting at both the extensive and intensive margin, 
particularly if enforcement is (perceived to be) weak (Kleven et al., 2011). Third-party reporting 
prevents this type of avoidance but is not always feasible for all assets.  
In settings with little or no third-party reporting, under-reporting appears to be a significant 
margin of response. In Switzerland, Brülhart et al. (2021) estimate that 50% of the overall 
taxable wealth elasticity (21.6 after 5 years) can be attributed to changes in reported financial 
assets, only a small proportion of which (1.3% of the aggregate response) is due to the voluntary 
disclosure of offshore assets. The authors attribute the remainder to changes in evasion 
behaviour, with individuals exploiting the lack of third-party reporting.11 Using household 
survey data, they estimate that income derived from wealth responds positively to a reduction 
in wealth tax rates, suggesting that individuals are encouraged to reveal their wealth previously 
hidden. Bunching estimates, which are generally thought to reflect reported, rather than real 
responses, appear to be larger in Switzerland (0.7 in Lucerne and 0.8 in Bern) than in other 
contexts, suggesting that some combination of avoidance and evasion could be more prevalent 
in Switzerland than elsewhere, even lower down the wealth distribution.  
Estimating the extent of under-reporting more directly, Seim (2017) compares the value of self-
reported assets in Sweden (mostly cars), with registry data on car values which was not utilised 
by tax administrators. Close to the exemption threshold, under-reporting appears to be rife; 75-
80% of taxpayers valued assets at less than their true value. Under-reporting can account for 
around one third of the (relatively small) bunching estimate, with an implied taxable wealth 
elasticity due to under-reporting of 0.03-0.09. 
In Colombia, wealthy business owners who bunch at tax notches are found to reduce their 
reported inventories (which are not subject to third-party reporting) by 22% (Londoño-Velez 
and Ávila-Mahecha, 2020). Assets whose values are reported by banks and financial institutions 
are not under-reported in this way. Individuals who bunch partly do so by inflating their 
liabilities, by 35% on average, with no evidence suggesting that this ‘debt’ is used to finance 
additional assets. These interpersonal debts, which are deductible, are not subject to third-party 
reporting, highlighting the need for verification of assets and liabilities.  
Though under-reporting appears to be fairly common in contexts relying on self-reported 
valuations, the magnitude of the problem in the UK will depend crucially on the feasibility of 
different approaches to valuing assets. Advani (forthcoming) highlights the importance of third-
party reporting in the context of income tax compliance in the UK. Similar results have been 
found in other countries e.g. Kleven et al. (2011) in Denmark; Phillips (2014) in the US; Clifford 
and Mavrokonstantis (2019) in Cyprus. Given the level of under-reporting when third-party 
reports are not used, it is clear that – where possible – it would be sensible to use them. Some 
 
10 Troup, Barnett and Bullock (2020) discuss the tools available to administrators in the UK. 
11 It is possible that some of this is driven by actual changes in financial wealth holdings if individuals shift 
wealth into exempted assets, although the Swiss wealth tax is broad based so we do not expect asset 
shifting to be a sizeable response. Transfers of ownership could also explain some of the response, if the 




assets might feasibly be reported by third parties. In this case, under-reporting will be confined 
to assets for which third-party reports are not available. 
Even in the absence of third-party reporting, under-reporting responses could be minimised by 
strict enforcement procedures. Auditing could play an important role here. Advani, Elming and 
Shaw (forthcoming) show in the UK that auditing can have a positive dynamic impact on 
individual income tax compliance, as once someone’s actual income has been established, it is 
difficult for them to under-report this in future years. For wealth, where changes may be more 
predictable, this positive effect of auditing may be even more pronounced. 
Imposing a wealth tax could also have a positive spill-over effect on compliance with other taxes, 
because tax authorities could use wealth tax returns to cross-check income tax and capital gains 
tax returns. This reduces the administration costs for those existing taxes, and increases the 
expected receipts from those taxes.  
3.2 Offshore evasion 
Causal evidence on the effect of wealth taxation on offshore evasion - the deliberate under-
reporting or hiding of wealth overseas - is scarce. Nevertheless, there is mounting evidence on 
the extent of offshore evasion practices among the wealthy in the U.S. (Guyton et al., 2020) and  
Scandinavia (Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman, 2019a), and further evidence suggesting 
that taxation induces offshoring responses (Londoño-Velez and Ávila-Mahecha, 2020; Hanlon, 
Maydew and Thornock, 2015; Kemme, Parikh and Steigner, 2017; Johannesen, 2014). Evidence 
on offshore avoidance – the legal use of tax rules which allow some offshore wealth holdings to 
go untaxed – is even harder to come by, and we do not discuss this issue at length.12 In many 
cases offshore avoidance is indistinguishable from changes in the asset composition of an 
individual’s wealth portfolio to include more non-taxable wealth (see Section 3.4). 
The concentration of offshoring practices among the wealthy makes this a potentially significant 
margin of response to wealth taxation. If the very wealthy can evade the tax, this could very 
quickly erode a substantial proportion of the tax base. The top 0.01% of Scandinavian taxpayers 
are estimated to evade around a quarter of their total tax liability through offshore evasion, with 
evaders hiding 40% of their true wealth abroad, an estimate based on evidence from data leaks 
(Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman, 2019a). Meanwhile, Spanish wealth tax payers who 
chose to disclose offshore assets during the 2012 tax amnesty were hiding 30% of their net 
worth, on average (Mas Montserrat and Mas Montserrat, 2019).  
The European Commission estimates UK offshore wealth to be 8.7% of GDP in 2016, (Vellutini 
et al., 2019, Table 3). Much of this wealth may be properly declared to tax authorities,13  but the 
potential revenue implications where individuals fail to do so are substantial. HMRC (2019) note 
that wealthy individuals in the UK “often have complex tax affairs covering multiple kinds of 
taxes, and have greater choice than most people about how to manage their income and assets”, 
and highlight their use of offshore jurisdictions. 
In Colombia, offshore evasion is identified as a primary margin of response among wealth tax 
payers (Londoño-Velez and Ávila-Mahecha, 2020). Using tax data linked to leaked information 
 
12 By “avoidance”, we include what lawyers refer to as “mitigation”. Whether individuals are able to legally 
reduce their tax burden by holding wealth in offshore financial institutions is a matter of tax design. A 
broad-based wealth tax which covers all worldwide assets would not enable tax avoidance (legal) through 
offshoring, but individuals could still engage in tax evasion (illegal), at a cost.  
13 Indeed in the UK, individuals who are resident but not domiciled in the UK are legally incentivised to 




on offshore accounts located in Panama (the ‘Panama Papers’), they find that individuals 
incorporate offshore entities and use these to reduce their reported assets by 7.7% in years in 
which these assets would result in a wealth tax liability. Opportunities to use offshore structures 
for tax evasion purposes are likely to be more ample in Colombia than in the UK, and the 
magnitude of the response clearly depends on the enforcement environment. The UK already 
has infrastructure in place to manage the tax affairs of high net worth individuals and reduce 
non-compliance (the Wealthy unit), so tax gaps arising from evasion are likely to be smaller than 
in Colombia (which has no Wealthy unit equivalent). However, the Colombian evidence 
highlights that a wealth tax does substantially affect the incentive to engage in offshore evasion, 
even if the opportunities to do so are country-specific. 
Information exchange initiatives, such as the exchange of information on request (EOIR) and 
automatic exchange of information (AEOI), can have an impact on offshore deposits (Hanlon, 
Maydew and Thornock, 2015; Heckemeyer and Hemmerich, 2018; Beer, Coelho and Leduc, 
2019; O’Reilly, Parra Ramirez and Stemmer, 2019; Johannesen et al., 2020), though not always 
on tax compliance as some individuals simply shift assets to non-cooperating havens 
(Johannesen and Zucman, 2014; Menkhoff and Miethe, 2019). Voluntary disclosure 
programmes, such as the Liechtenstein Disclosure Facility in the UK, encourage some to declare 
unpaid capital and income taxes from offshore investments to tax authorities (HMRC, 2016), 
and have successfully improved tax compliance in other contexts (Mas Montserrat and Mas 
Montserrat, 2019; Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman, 2019b; Johannesen et al., 2020; 
Londoño-Velez and Ávila-Mahecha, 2020). They also highlight the extent of non-compliance 
that was taking place before the scheme was introduced. Efforts to tackle evasion will play an 
important role in deterring evasion responses to wealth taxation. New technologies, such as 
machine learning methods to detect tax evasion based on wealth tax returns, could present 
opportunities which enhance the feasibility of enforcing wealth taxation in the 21st Century 
(Mas Montserrat and Mas Montserrat, 2019). Then again, new technologies may also be used to 
develop novel evasion strategies.  
One concern might be that if enforcement initiatives prevent the wealthy from being able to 
evade taxes, they would instead opt to avoid their wealth tax liability by legally manipulating 
their wealth portfolios. Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman (2019b) estimate that 
enforcement efforts encouraging the disclosure of offshore assets in Norway resulted in a 30% 
rise in taxes paid by those who disclosed. Disclosers were concentrated at the top of the income 
distribution, making up 2% of the top 1%; 6% of the top 0.1%; and 11% of the top 0.01%. The 
increase in taxes paid persisted over time, suggesting that legal and illegal forms of tax 
avoidance are not as substitutable as some might fear, at least in contexts with a broad tax base.  
3.3 Gifts and fragmentation 
Rather than transferring assets overseas, wealthy individuals may respond to wealth taxation 
by legally transferring assets into someone else’s name. This could involve genuine inter vivos 
giving, potentially as a substitute for bequests transferred on death. This imposes a real cost on 
the donor, who sacrifices benefit from and control of the assets. Alternatively, individuals may 
transfer assets into the name of their spouse or children while potentially retaining effective 
control (also known as ‘fragmentation’), with or without retaining some benefit.14 This would 
 
14 Individuals could transfer legal ownership to spouses or minor children but retain control over and 
continue to benefit from the assets. Alternatively, individuals in the UK could fragment their wealth by 
splitting assets into trusts, transferring legal ownership and benefit but retaining some control over how 




minimise the overall tax burden on the household if the assets owned by some family member 
place them in a lower (or nil rate) tax band. 
The primary policy choices determining this margin of response are the use of individual versus 
household taxation, the exemption threshold and overall progressivity of the tax schedule, and 
the tax treatment of gifts. Taxing at an individual, rather than household level, creates 
opportunities for the reallocation of assets toward household members facing a lower marginal 
tax rate. Married couples in the United Kingdom have, in the past, responded to incentives to 
reallocate assets among themselves. The transition from joint to independent income taxation 
in 1990 prompted significant intra-spousal asset shifting (Stephens and Ward-Batts, 2004). 
Assets were reallocated such that investment income accrued to the spouse with the lower 
marginal tax rate. However, the majority of households did not fully exploit this opportunity to 
reduce their tax liability.  
Tax rate thresholds and the overall progressivity of the tax schedule also affect incentives and 
opportunities to gift. The more progressive the tax schedule, the greater the tax advantages that 
can be obtained by transferring wealth to those facing a lower marginal rate. In contrast, under 
a tax schedule featuring a low exemption threshold and flat tax rate, the opportunity to gift may 
be limited by the smaller number of individuals whose own wealth places them in the nil rate 
band. Under such a tax, gifting would have minimal impact on the tax liability of those with 
wealth well in excess of the nil rate band, reducing the incentive to gift among the ultra-wealthy.  
Very wealthy individuals may be best placed to take advantage of the opportunity to gift, since 
they can maintain a high standard of living while sacrificing benefit and control over some of 
their assets (effectively making early bequests). An alternative method of gifting, however, is to 
transfer legal ownership while retaining effective control and benefit (e.g. by transferring to 
one’s spouse).  This is associated with a risk of losing the assets if the relationship breaks down. 
Unfortunately, the existing literature does not help us to distinguish between these types of 
giving, or who is most likely to engage in each. Alternative opportunities to fragment, such as the 
splitting of assets into multiple trusts or family investment companies, could also be a potential 
cause for concern (Chamberlain, 2020), though again the existing literature does not help us 
establish this. 
Gifting responses to wealth taxation will depend on the tax treatment of these transfers. While 
substantial gifts to children (and other relatives except spouses) made within 7 years of death 
are chargeable to inheritance tax in the UK, gifts between spouses are exempt. This exemption 
encourages transfers of ownership, if the tax were levied at an individual level, which would 
reduce the tax yield without necessarily increasing the spread of wealth across households. 
More broadly, the UK tax system does little to discourage inter vivos transfers of cash providing 
the donor survives long enough, which could increase their appeal as a response to wealth 
taxation, though inter vivos gifts of other assets are subject to Capital Gains Tax.  
Exploiting the reintroduction of wealth taxation in Catalonia, Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and 
Mas-Montserrat (2019) identify a positive gifting response; a 1pp increase in the average tax 
rate increases the probability of making a gift by 2.7pp, though this effect dissipates after two 
years. This modest response may be partly due to the fact that gifts are taxable under Spanish 
law. The interaction of wealth taxation with gift and inheritance tax is important as it can affect 
both the level and timing of tax revenues (see Summers, 2021, for more information on the 
interaction between these taxes). For example, if wealthy individuals respond to wealth taxation 
by increasing gifting, this may reduce the level of bequests chargeable to inheritance tax upon 
death. This would affect future tax revenues and reduce the wealth tax revenue collected in the 





Empirical evidence suggests that individuals do adjust the timing of their gifts in response to 
changes in the relative tax advantages of giving and bequeathing (Bernheim, Lemke and Scholz, 
2004; Joulfaian, 2005, McGarry, 2000). Joulfaian (2005) estimates that a 10% drop in the price 
of gifts relative to bequests raises the probability of making a gift by 4.3pp, and the level of gifts 
by 29%. However, in responding to various tax incentives, people tend to give too little relative 
to what they ought to give if their sole objective was minimising the tax liability on their wealth 
transfers (Joulfaian and McGarry, 2004; McGarry, 2000, 2001; Poterba, 2001) or household 
income (Stephens and Ward-Batts, 2004).15 Small responses to tax incentives may be due to the 
desire to maintain control over one’s assets until death (Kopczuk, 2007), though some evidence 
suggests that this cannot be the only explanation (Goupille-Lebret and Infante, 2018). If 
individuals wish to maintain control over their wealth, gifting responses to wealth taxation may 
be smaller than responses to inheritance tax incentives observed shortly before death. In the 
UK, there is evidence of a broad lack of awareness over the inheritance tax treatment of inter 
vivos gifts (Dolton et al., 2019), which could partly explain why tax incentives are not fully 
exploited.  
3.4 Asset composition 
Individuals unwilling or unable to avoid wealth taxation through reallocation within the 
household might instead minimise their tax liability by reallocating their wealth across different 
asset classes. Erosion of the tax base through asset composition responses, generally arising due 
to the tax base being narrowed by exemptions and reliefs, contributed to the arguments for 
repealing wealth taxation in several OECD countries (see Perret, 2020). Findings of portfolio 
composition responses to tax incentives are common, not only in the wealth tax literature, 
focused on taxes on the stock of wealth (Alvaredo and Saez, 2009; Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, 
and Mas-Montserrat, 2019; Ring, 2020; Zoutman, 2015), but also with regards to estate 
taxation – taxes on the transfers of wealth at death (Kopczuk, 2007; Poterba and Weisbenner, 
2003), and capital income taxation – taxes on the returns from wealth (Alan et al., 2010; King 
and Leape, 1998; Poterba and Samwick, 2003).  
Asset composition responses can only be used as a means of avoiding wealth taxation to the 
extent that some assets offer a tax advantage over others, increasing the ‘plasticity’ of the tax 
base (Scheuer and Slemrod, 2020b). Exempting some assets altogether from wealth taxation 
clearly incentivises individuals to hold wealth in those forms. However, other types of tax 
advantage can also induce behavioural responses (Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-
Montserrat, 2019, see below). Shifting the form in which wealth is held is not a frictionless 
process and assets are often held in one form or another for reasons other than tax minimisation 
(most individuals live in the houses they own, for example), so the magnitude of this response is 
an empirical question. 
Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat (2019) estimate that in Spain, a 1pp increase 
in the average wealth tax rate resulted in an 18.1pp increase in the share of exempt assets over 
a 4-year period. There was a 9.6pp increase in the share of exempt business assets, and a 0.6pp 
increase in the share of exempt main dwellings. Total reported wealth (which excludes most 
exempted assets) did not change in response to the wealth tax. In fact, wealth accumulation 
increased if we assume that tax liabilities were paid out of the total wealth stock. This suggests 
that their taxable wealth elasticity of 32.4 may be driven almost entirely by asset composition 
responses. Over a 4-year period, this figure implies a revenue loss equivalent to 2.6 times the 
 





forecasted annual wealth tax revenue. Exempting assets can, it seems, have extremely large 
revenue implications.  
Exempting certain assets can create horizontal inequities as not all individuals have equal access 
to different forms of wealth. Indeed, Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat (2019) 
find that individuals are much more responsive in their portfolio reallocation if they own a 
relatively high share of wealth in the form of business shares. If wealthier individuals have 
disproportionate access to tax-advantaged assets (as is the case in many countries, including 
Spain), this creates the risk of an intentionally progressive wealth tax becoming regressive. This 
process became one of the arguments contributing to the abolition of the Swedish wealth tax in 
2006 (Waldenström, 2018). Alvaredo and Saez (2009) also identify a substantial asset shifting 
response to the exemption of stock for owner-managers in Spain in 1994, which “gradually and 
substantially eroded the wealth tax base”. Individuals responded by increasing their share of 
stock in companies they owned or increasing the share of labour and business income derived 
from the business in order to fulfil the criteria for a tax exemption.16 
In Spain, we also observe an increase in the share of assets which are not themselves exempt, 
but which provide alternative opportunities to avoid the tax (Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and 
Mas-Montserrat, 2019), and there is some evidence of a similar response in France 
(Chamberlain, 2020). The share of listed equity and investment funds in Spain rose by 11.5pp in 
response to a 1pp increase in the average tax rate. As a solution to liquidity concerns, Catalonian 
legislation limits an individual’s total income and wealth tax liability to 60% of their taxable 
income—similar legislation exists (or used to) in France, Sweden, and some Swiss Cantons 
(OECD, 2018; Du Rietz and Henrekson, 2014). Individuals can exploit this by manipulating 
capital gains realisations; long-term capital gains do not count in the taxable income calculation. 
Shifting wealth into assets producing returns in the form of capital gains thus enables the 
individual to avoid taxation. While dealing with liquidity issues is a necessary consideration in 
the design of wealth taxation (see Loutzenhiser and Mann, 2020), evidence from Spain suggests 
that solving this issue through a tax ceiling can induce unintended behavioural responses. Note 
that the fiscal effects of this kind of response go beyond wealth tax revenues; shifts in income 
composition also affect income tax revenues. Such a response could have a significant impact on 
tax revenues in the UK in particular, where capital gains are currently taxed at a much lower rate 
than income in other forms.   
Evidence from other capital taxes also finds portfolio shifting responses to be important. 
Kopczuk (2007) finds that the onset of a terminal illness induces “deathbed” estate planning in 
the U. S., including the disposal of business assets and collectable and valuables upon which 
estate tax is due.17  Estate tax planning has also been shown in the Netherlands (Suari-Andreu 
et al., 2019) and Norway (Kvaerner, 2019). Such tax planning is likely to be less widespread in 
the context of an annual wealth tax as individuals can less easily manipulate their taxable assets 
year-on-year. This is one argument in favour of taxing wealth annually rather than at death.  
An alternative reason for shifting asset compositions in response to wealth taxation is 
differences in valuation methodologies. Assets which are difficult to value, such as private 
businesses and those traded in thin markets, might be reported to tax authorities with some 
 
16 Eligibility required the individual to own at least 15% of the business, or the family at least 20%. It also 
required the individual to derive over 50% of his/her labour and business income from this business 
activity.  
17 The specific responses of individuals to estate taxation will depend on the tax design. For example, in 
the UK, keeping and passing on business assets is more tax efficient as this attracts a CGT uplift (taxes on 





discretion, enabling individuals to reduce their overall tax burden. Evidence for the UK suggests 
that private businesses are concentrated at the top of the wealth distribution, with business 
assets accounting for around 10% of the wealth holdings of the wealthiest 10%, compared to 
less than 1% at the median (Advani, Bangham and Leslie, 2021). This pattern is reflected 
elsewhere, including in Norway (Fagereng et al., 2021), France (Garbinti, Goupille-Lebret and 
Piketty, 2020), Spain (Martínez-Toledano, 2020), and the US (Smith et al., 2019). This suggests 
that wealthier households are particularly well positioned to benefit from ambiguity over the 
value of their assets. 
Bjørneby, Markussen and Røed (2020) argue that this incentive to shift toward hard-to-value 
assets can explain why higher wealth tax liabilities lead to an increase in small business 
investment in Norway, where the tax value of unlisted shares is typically well below market 
value.18 Though portfolio reallocation reduces the tax yield, the evidence from Norway suggests 
that this particular margin of response can have a positive effect on employment.  Poterba and 
Weisbenner (2003) also provide evidence consistent with this margin of response in the context 
of estate taxation in the US: individuals switched toward hard-to-value asset classes whose 
values are easier to manipulate for tax purposes.  
The problem of valuing hard-to-value assets applies to any form of asset-based taxation, such as 
inheritance tax or the UK's Annual Tax on Enveloped Dwellings. Some countries have responded 
to this issue by excluding or offering favourable treatment of these assets in their wealth tax 
base, which often contributed to a sense of unfairness (Kopczuk, 2019). It would not be possible 
to prevent individuals from reporting the lowest of a range of plausible asset values. Third party 
reporting is not an option for these assets.  and professional valuations – such as those obtained 
for inheritance tax purposes – can return a range of legitimate estimates. However, exempting 
hard-to-value assets altogether in order to avoid such reporting responses would create even 
stronger incentives for asset shifting than those created by valuation methods which allow for 
some discretion. 
One response which may be particularly relevant in the case of a wealth tax, but for which we 
have little empirical evidence, is the use of debt as a means of reducing one’s tax liability. An 
individual’s tax liability, when levied on net wealth, could be artificially reduced by taking on 
additional debt, particularly ‘soft’ loans which impose little cost on the borrower.19 Taking out a 
loan does not, on its own, reduce an individual’s tax liability. However, individuals can then 
reduce their tax liability by investing the funds in tax exempt or tax advantaged assets. Evidence 
from a capital income tax reform in Denmark suggests that households significantly reduced 
their mortgage debts in response to a phase-out of debt deductibility, suggesting that debt 
holdings are responsive to tax incentives (Alan and Leth-Petersen, 2006). Wealthier individuals, 
with disproportionate access to credit markets, may be most likely to pursue this option. Careful 
choices regarding the type of debts which can be deducted are therefore needed to minimise 
the risk of erosion of the tax base. Some countries allow only for the deduction of debt taken on 
to purchase taxable assets, with the exception of student debt which is also deducted (e.g. 
Sweden). Where debts are self-reported, there is a risk that individuals may inflate their 
liabilities, as Londoño-Velez and Ávila-Mahecha (2020) find in the Colombian context.  
Most jurisdictions levying a wealth tax choose to exempt pension assets from taxable wealth. 
One concern is that individuals may respond by shifting wealth into pension funds. On this, we 
have no direct empirical evidence. However, Chetty et al. (2014) study the implications of 
 
18 Positive income effects – the incentive to save more overall to cover future tax liabilities – could also 
contribute to explaining the positive effect on business investment in Norway. 
19 `Soft’ loans are loans offering low interest rates (typically below the market rate) and possibly other 




subsidies for retirement accounts on savings patterns. They find that 15% of the population are 
“active savers”, who respond to the increased tax advantage on pensions by shifting their 
savings into retirement accounts; the total value of savings does not change. These “active 
savers” tend to be wealthier and more financially savvy than individuals who do not adjust their 
saving behaviour. This has three implications for a wealth tax. First, including pension assets in 
the tax is unlikely to discourage retirement saving, since this is not very responsive to tax. 
Second, excluding pensions from such a tax is likely to induce a minority of individuals to shift 
more of their savings into pensions.20 Third, individuals who do respond are likely to be relatively 
wealthier, reducing the progressivity of the tax.  
Exempting assets can also affect the mechanical response of wealth to wealth taxation. 
Exempting main homes, for instance, could induce an asset shift toward real estate. This could 
augment the house price capitalisation effect as homes would be tax advantaged relative to 
other assets. On the other hand, an increase in house prices relative to the price of other assets 
would, to some extent, act to temper this effect. 
Asset composition responses can be minimised by maintaining as broad a tax base as possible. 
Exempting assets creates clear incentives to avoid taxation through shifts of asset composition, 
and this is likely to entail broader fiscal effects (on income tax revenues, for instance). 
Alternative tax advantages implicitly bestowed on certain assets, which can arise as unintended 
consequences of solutions to liquidity concerns or valuation difficulties, may also induce shifts 
in asset composition, though the effects of these are likely to be smaller than the effects of 
exempting assets altogether. 
3.5 Savings 
Given limited opportunities to adjust the structure of asset holdings to avoid a wealth tax, 
individuals may, instead, adjust the total value of their asset holdings. The argument that wealth 
taxation reduces the incentive to save has played a role in the decline in wealth taxes in OECD 
countries (see Perret, 2020). As the theoretical argument goes, the imposition of a tax on wealth 
reduces the return on saving, encouraging individuals to spend more (or work less) today, and 
put less aside for the future. In practice, there is little empirical evidence of substantial savings 
responses to wealth taxation in other countries, and mixed evidence on savings responses to 
other tax incentives.  
Even from a theoretical perspective, it is not clear that wealth taxation has a negative 
behavioural impact on saving. Substitution effects arising from the diminished rate of return 
negatively affect savings incentives. However, individuals also experience an income effect: 
they are incentivised to save more to compensate for the erosion of their future wealth unless 
the imposition of a wealth tax is offset by other tax cuts or spending increases that make 
individuals paying the wealth tax no worse off overall. This theoretical argument has furthered 
the case for a positive tax rate on capital (Straub and Werning, 2020). Empirical evidence from 
the wealth tax literature suggests that savings responses are small (Durán-Cabré, Esteller-
Moré, and Mas-Montserrat, 2019; Seim, 2017; Brülhart et al., 2021), possibly even positive in 
some contexts (Ring, 2020). 
Some papers find small reductions in saving rates. Seim (2017) directly estimates saving 
responses to wealth taxation using a difference-in-differences approach, finding economically 
negligible and statistically insignificant effects. Neither taxable savings nor exempt pension 
contributions respond to wealth taxation in Sweden. In Switzerland, Brülhart et al. (2021) argue 
 
20 Such a response may be dampened if there are provisions which limit pension contributions in other 




that had individuals saved/invested their tax savings resulting from the tax rate cut, this could 
explain 5.7% of the aggregate taxable wealth response. Yet, the observed savings response 
explains only 4.3%, suggesting that individuals consume some of their ‘mechanical’ tax savings 
and do not increase actual saving in response to a reduction in wealth tax rates.  
In some contexts it appears income effects dominate, with total wealth rising. In Spain, Durán-
Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat (2019) find little evidence of changes in total wealth 
(though taxable wealth is reduced) in response to the reintroduction of wealth taxation. If 
anything, total wealth increases in responses to the tax after accounting for mechanical effects, 
potentially consistent with strong income effects. Ring (2020) finds that wealth taxation in 
Norway tends to have a positive effect on yearly household saving in a setting where evasion 
responses are muted. He finds that for each additional Norwegian Krone subject to a 1% wealth 
tax, households increase their yearly saving by 0.04 NOK – four times the amount needed to pay 
the tax and maintain the same level of wealth. This increase in savings is financed primarily 
through increased labour supply. Ring’s findings support strong income effects in the Norwegian 
context; those with wealth initially below the exemption threshold respond less strongly than 
households with wealth above the exemption threshold, for whom the income effects are 
greater.  
More broadly, evidence on the responsiveness of wealth accumulation to tax incentives is 
mixed. Responses to tax incentives for retirement savings tend to be small on average and are 
often confined to a minority of ‘active’ savers, who tend to be wealthier than those who are less 
responsive (Attanasio and DeLeire, 2002; Attanasio, Banks and Wakefield, 2005; Antón, Muñoz 
de Bustillo and Fernández-Macías, 2014; Chetty et al., 2014; Paiella and Tiseno, 2014). Other 
studies find positive, but often modest, responses to an increased incentive to save for 
retirement (Hubbard and Skinner, 1996; Poterba, Venti and Wise, 1996; Benjamin, 2003; Rossi, 
2009; Gelber, 2011; Beshears et al., 2017). Estate and inheritance taxes are found to have 
negative, but generally modest, effects on wealth accumulation (Holtz-Eakin and Marples, 2001; 
Kopczuk and Slemrod, 2001; Joulfaian, 2006; Goupille-Lebret and Infante, 2018). Overall, it 
seems that individuals’ saving behaviour may be less influenced by tax incentives than the 
predictions of frictionless life-cycle models of optimal behaviour would imply. 
3.6 Labour supply 
If individuals were to save more, they could do this either by reducing their consumption or 
increasing their labour supply. Through its effect on the return to saving, wealth taxation thus 
affects the labour leisure trade-off. Though we have no empirical evidence on the effect of 
wealth taxes on the labour supply response, we do observe the effect on labour income in a 
number of contexts, which should be positively correlated with hours worked. 
Brülhart et al. (2021) find no earnings response to wealth taxation in Switzerland, nor does Seim 
(2017) find any significant effect in Sweden. In contrast, Ring (2020) identifies a small positive 
effect of wealth taxation on taxable labour income in Norway: for each additional NOK subject 
to the wealth tax, households increase annual taxable labour income by 0.01 NOK. The 
cumulative effect of increased labour income in Norway explains at least half of the cumulative 
savings effect over a 5-year period. By contrast, in Spain taxable income reduces in response to 
the reintroduction of wealth taxation (Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat, 
2019). However, this is likely due to changes in income composition as individuals shift towards 
capital gains in response to the tax liability cap, rather than to reduced incentives to finance 
wealth accumulation.  
The lack of labour supply response is unsurprising given that many individuals are unable to 




supply responses to marginal tax rates (typically income taxes) tend to be small (see e.g. Saez, 
Slemrod and Giertz, 2012, for a review). If responses to income tax incentives are small, it would 
perhaps be odd to find that wealth taxes, which only indirectly affect the return to hours worked, 
have a significant effect on labour supply. Wealth taxes also raise revenue from some groups of 
individuals where we are particularly unlikely to observe a response in terms of labour supply. 
First, wealth is disproportionately skewed toward the top of the age distribution, and retirees 
are only able to adjust labour supply on the extensive margin. Since this is likely to be more 
costly, they are less likely to respond. Second, wealth is disproportionately held by business 
owners (Advani, Bangham and Leslie, 2021), who receive much of their remuneration in the 
form of dividends or capital gains. These individuals may respond, but it would not be observed 
from studying their labour income.  
For the very wealthy, entrepreneurial risk-taking may be a more relevant margin of response 
than hours worked. One way in which wealth taxation may discourage entrepreneurship is by 
reducing the net return to entrepreneurial activity.21 In a difference-in-differences analysis, 
Hansson (2008) studies the effect of wealth taxation on self-employment in OECD countries, 
identifying negative, but economically modest, effects. By contrast, Bjørneby, Markussen and 
Røed (2020) show that investments in small businesses increased in response to wealth taxation 
in Norway, although this is largely because business owners had an incentive to increase 
investment (particularly human capital investment) in businesses which are taxed favourably 
relative to other assets (see Section 3.4).  
Guvenen et al. (2019) argue that, in theory, a wealth tax may be better at encouraging 
entrepreneurship than a capital income tax. A wealth tax taxes the stock of wealth, regardless 
of the rate of return, whereas a capital income tax is paid only on the flow of income generated 
by an asset. A capital income tax therefore taxes high returns (which may reflect entrepreneurial 
talent) at the same rate as low returns, whereas a wealth tax implies a lower effective tax rate 
on the income flows of entrepreneurs who generate high returns.22 However, there is little 
empirical evidence on the effects of a wealth tax on entrepreneurship among the very wealthy.  
3.7 Migration 
The emigration of wealthy individuals is commonly regarded as a threat to efforts to tax wealth, 
especially in an age of increasing globalisation and high-skilled mobility. This argument has 
contributed to the decline of wealth taxes in OECD countries (Perret, 2020). Wealth taxation 
may also put off wealthy foreigners from moving to the UK, with broader economic implications. 
We assess the validity of this concern with reference to existing evidence on migration 
responses to wealth, estate and inheritance, and income taxation. On balance, the existing 
evidence suggests that migration responses to all forms of taxation are small relative to 
potential revenue, and there is little support for the view that the emigration of wealthy 
taxpayers poses a significant threat to progressive taxation.  
As with taxable wealth elasticities, estimates of migration responses to taxation are highly 
contextual. Migration elasticities are sensitive to the size of the initial base and the ease of 
mobility. For this reason, within-country elasticities tend to be higher than one might expect in 
an international setting. In Spain and Switzerland, we have direct evidence on inter-regional 
 
21 Wealth taxation may also affect levels of entrepreneurship by reducing the pool of capital available for 
financing. 
22 Model details are important here. In a related paper, Boar and Knowles (2020) find that capital income 
taxes should still be preferred to wealth taxes. We do not compare the models directly here; we merely 
note that empirical evidence is essential in this context, where differing model assumptions can deliver 




mobility responses to wealth taxation, which in both contexts is substantial.23 Agrawal et al. 
(2020) identify wealthy individuals flocking to Madrid following the reintroduction of the 
Spanish wealth tax in 2011, with Madrid serving as an internal tax haven. Using variation in tax 
rates across Spanish regions, they estimate an elasticity of the stock of taxpayers with respect 
to the net-of-tax rate of 7.9. Though substantial, this response is driven almost entirely by the 
status of Madrid as an internal tax haven which offers a top marginal rate of 0% compared to a 
minimum top rate of 2.5% in other regions; individuals do not respond to smaller variations in 
tax rates across jurisdictions, where top marginal rates vary by 1.25pp at most.  The authors find 
that the pattern of responses is consistent with reported, rather than real, changes in location, 
which may be harder to accomplish at an international level. For example, the UK already has 
strictly defined criteria for when an individual is considered "tax resident" (see Chamberlain, 
2021 for further discussion). This suggests that while the use of tax havens may be a critical 
margin of response (see Section 3.2), actual migration responses are small. 
In Switzerland, Brülhart et al. (2021) estimate that 24% of the overall taxable wealth elasticity 
is accounted for by migration, with 17% reflecting migration within Switzerland. Moving across 
cantons is less cumbersome than migrating internationally, and the small size of Swiss cantons 
is likely to imply larger relative responses than would be applicable at a national level as 
individuals can relocate while retaining the same job, language, and so on. Brülhart et al. (2021) 
also find that a further 20% of the aggregate response can be attributed to house price 
capitalization, which is indirectly caused by mobility. In sum, this implies that 34% of the (large) 
taxable wealth elasticity is induced by intra-national mobility (Brülhart et al., 2019).24 These 
responses are therefore likely to be much higher than one would see in the context of a 
nationally levied UK wealth tax. It is possible however, that if individuals could not migrate 
across cantons to avoid the tax, we would observe a higher proportion migrating abroad.  
Recent evidence suggests that international migration responses to wealth taxation are very 
small indeed. Jakobsen et al. (2021) estimate the migration response to three Scandinavian 
wealth tax reforms: the 1988 wealth tax cut in Denmark which reduced the marginal tax rate 
from 2.2% to 1%; and the abolition of the wealth taxes in Denmark (1996) and Sweden (2007), 
which cut the marginal tax rate from 1% and 1.5%, respectively, to zero. In both settings, a 1 
percentage point reduction in the tax rate reduced the probability of out-migration among 
wealth tax payers by around -0.1 percentage points. This implies an elasticity of the stock of 
wealth tax payers of around 4.3, almost half the inter-regional migration response observed in 
Spain. The study also finds an anticipatory response: individuals with wealthy fathers – who 
presumably expect to inherit in future – become less likely to emigrate following the reduction 
of the wealth tax. Overall, despite clear evidence of international migration responses to wealth 
taxation, these responses are far too small to result in serious revenue effects. 
Evidence on mobility responses to estate and inheritance taxation suggests that the location 
choices of older, wealthy individuals are relatively inelastic (Bakija and Slemrod, 2004; Conway 
and Rork, 2006; Brülhart and Parchet, 2014). This is true even in contexts where inter-regional, 
rather than international migration is likely to be the primary response. The exception is Moretti 
and Wilson (2020), who find significant mobility responses among billionaires to heterogeneity 
 
23 At a national level, migration can erode the tax base in two ways. The first is the emigration of wealthy 
individuals, which is the focus of the current discussion. However, where taxes are levied at a sub-national 
level, tax differentials across regions also incentivises migration to lower tax jurisdictions within the same 
country, reducing the total tax revenue which is collected across all regions. This is illustrated clearly in 
Spain, where 5% of wealth tax revenue is sacrificed through internal tax-induced migration (Agrawal, 
Foremny and Martinez-Toledano, 2020). 
24 This figure is calculated assuming that international migration accounts for a quarter of the house price 




in estate and inheritance taxation across US states. However, this appears to be largely driven 
by migration to the San Francisco area. Although California does not have an estate tax, this 
migration is likely to be motivated by the location of the tech industry rather than estate tax 
considerations. Migration responses to a tax which is levied only once, upon death, cannot easily 
be compared to responses to an annual wealth tax. On the one hand, being subject to a recurrent 
wealth tax may provide a stronger incentive to migrate. On the other hand, individuals may 
weigh estate and inheritance tax considerations more highly in their location choices nearer the 
end of their life, and respond accordingly, given that they are able to reside wherever they like 
during their lifetime.  
Personal income taxes are generally found to induce small although statistically significant 
responses among wealthy taxpayers, with the elasticity of the stock of wealthy taxpayers 
ranging from 0.03 to 2 (see Kleven et al., 2020, for a review). This implies a 1% reduction in the 
net-of-tax rate on income (for example an increase in the average income tax rate from 20% to 
20.8%, which reduces the net of tax rate by 0.8pp from 80% to 79.2%) leads to a 0.03-2% 
reduction in the number of wealthy taxpayers. Again, responses are highly sensitive to context 
and the size of the initial base. Studies of international mobility tend to find an elasticity of the 
stock of rich foreign taxpayers close to one, and an elasticity of the stock of rich domestic 
taxpayers close to zero (Muñoz, 2020; Akcigit, Baslandze and Stantcheva, 2016; Kleven, Landais 
and Saez, 2013; Kleven et al., 2014). This lends some support to the argument that taxation 
could damage a country’s ability to attract rich taxpayers from abroad.25 However, Muñoz 
(2020) estimates the elasticity of rich taxpayers to personal income taxation across European 
countries and finds that the foreign elasticity in the UK is well below the European average,26 
suggesting that discouraging wealthy foreigners may be less of a concern in the UK than in other 
contexts. Recent evidence also suggests that high income migrants in the UK (many of whom are 
also likely to feature at the top of the wealth distribution) are heavily concentrated in the finance 
industry where there are strong agglomeration externalities (Advani et al., 2020). Such 
taxpayers may be less responsive to tax incentives than wealthy migrants in other contexts, as 
their mobility is constrained by the location of their work. 
To the extent that migration responses to a UK wealth tax could pose a threat, this could be 
offset by policy choices. Limiting an individual’s ability to escape the tax by emigrating, by 
continuing to tax them for a minimum period after departure for instance, could prevent an 
immediate leakage of the tax base (see Chamberlain, 2020).  
 
25 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the reintroduction of a Spanish wealth tax may have discouraged 
wealthy foreign migration into Spain, except to Madrid (Ramallo, 2020). 
26 Using the lower bound estimate, the United Kingdom has a smaller foreign elasticity (0.635) than 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland, is 
equal to Germany, and higher than France. The European average is 0.673. Using the upper bound 
estimate, the United Kingdom has a smaller foreign elasticity (1.46) than all of these countries, relative to 




4. What can the UK learn from this? 
Estimating the amount of revenue that a UK wealth tax could collect is vital for the current 
debate. If a wealth tax were to ultimately raise very little revenue, it may not be worth the 
administrative and political cost of imposing one. Revenue calculations must account for 
potential behavioural responses, which result in actual taxable wealth diverging from estimates 
of the current stock as presented in Advani, Bangham and Leslie (2021). However, as this paper 
shows, quantifying the elasticity of taxable wealth and the magnitude of individual margins is far 
from straightforward. The elasticity is highly dependent on context and policy design, while the 
different methodological approaches used in previous studies capture different types of 
response. To produce a plausible elasticity estimate for the UK, we consider which margins drive 
the taxable wealth elasticity in different contexts, and to what extent these might be reduced 
under a well-designed wealth tax.  
For revenue modelling, it is the cumulative effect of all behavioural responses which is relevant. 
As discussed in Section 2.5, elasticity estimates based on bunching capture only a limited range 
of response margins and individuals. However, as discussed in Section 2.5, bunching estimates 
are still valuable for revenue analysis, as they indicate the taxable wealth response we might 
expect to see around tax rate thresholds and, in particular, the potential efficiency costs of 
adopting a banded valuation approach. For now, we focus on the studies which produce more 
comprehensive estimates of the taxable wealth elasticity (Brülhart et al., 2021; Jakobsen et al., 
2020; Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat, 2019; Zoutman, 2018). 
A UK-wide wealth tax would not give rise to the inter-regional tax competition and mobility 
observed in Switzerland, nor the house price capitalisation resulting indirectly from this 
mobility (Brülhart et al., 2021). Brülhart et al. (2019) estimate that intra-national mobility could 
account for around 34% of the aggregate taxable wealth elasticity. Shutting off this effect 
reduces their net-of-tax elasticity to 28.5 after 5 years.  
Brülhart et al. (2021) argue that changes in the reported value of financial assets could explain 
as much as 50% of their taxable wealth elasticity (i.e. 21.6), which they attribute to changes in 
evasion behaviour facilitated by a lack of third-party reporting. A well-designed wealth tax 
which makes extensive use of third-party reporting could shut off much of this response.27 If 
both the inter-regional migration response and the reporting response were shut down, this 
would reduce the Swiss elasticity to just 6.9.  Even if only half of the reporting response could be 
shut down, this would bring the elasticity down to around 17.7.  
Little is known about which margins of response drive the elasticity estimates in Denmark and 
the Netherlands (Jakobsen et al., 2020; Zoutman, 2018). In the Netherlands, simultaneous 
reforms to other parts of the tax system make it difficult to conclude that the estimated 
elasticity in Zoutman (2018) only reflects responses to the wealth tax reform. Jakobsen et al. 
(2020) note that in Denmark, most assets are third-party reported, limiting opportunities for 
under-reporting. Denmark also maintained a broad tax base, suggesting that asset composition 
responses may have been less pronounced than in the Spanish context below, and did not have 
regional variation in wealth tax structure. Consistent with this, the Danish elasticity is estimated 
 
27 It is possible that a small proportion of the financial wealth response is driven by shifts in asset 
composition (see Section 3.1). Conversely, it is possible that a small proportion of the Catalan response – 
discussed subsequently – is driven by evasion (see section 3.4). However, a wealth tax which maintains a 




to be 8.9 for moderately wealthy individuals (11.3 for very wealthy individuals), close to the 
Swiss elasticity (6.9) when internal migration and reporting responses are shut down. 
However, the Danish elasticity estimate does not capture any international migration 
responses, which a comprehensive estimate of the UK elasticity would ideally incorporate. 
Agrawal, Formeny, and Martinez-Toledano (2020) estimate a taxable wealth elasticity which 
isolates the impact of inter-regional migration, which we expect to be above the effect induced 
by international migration. Simply adding their elasticity estimate of 5.8 to the Danish elasticity 
would imply an upper bound of around 17.1 for the very wealthy, close to the Swiss elasticity 
when we shut down half of the reporting effect (17.7). This highlights that the elasticities 
produced for both Denmark and Switzerland are much more consistent with one another than 
they first appear to be, once differences in methodology and tax design are accounted for. 
In Catalonia, portfolio shifts toward tax-advantaged assets are identified as a key margin of 
response (Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat, 2019). In fact, while the authors 
identify a taxable wealth elasticity of 32.4 after 4 years, total wealth including exempted assets 
does not respond at all to the reintroduction of the wealth tax, with an elasticity of -2 which is 
statistically insignificant. This suggests that asset composition responses drive almost all of the 
taxable wealth response. The implication for the UK is that, under a broad-based wealth tax 
which treats all assets equally, so shuts down this margin, overall behavioural responses (here 
excluding international migration) could be very small. However, it is worth noting that a likely 
reason why the response is so small here is the temporary nature of the tax, which was due to 
last only two years.  
Having never had a comprehensive wealth tax, it is hard to be certain how individuals would 
respond to a UK wealth tax. The scope for such responses would clearly depend on policy design. 
The evidence from other countries suggests that a well-designed wealth tax which covers all 
assets and makes extensive use of third-party reporting could achieve an elasticity in the region 
of 7-17 after a period of 4-8 years, depending on assumptions made about the size of 
international migration responses. This implies that a 1% wealth tax could reduce the tax base 
by 7-17%. The ideal wealth tax from the point of view of minimising behavioural responses 
would feature a broad base, equal treatment of asset classes, extensive use of third-party 
reporting, exit charges (or similar) to discourage migration, robust enforcement procedures, and 
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